1. Centre plans ‘market’ scheme to promote sustainable living

It aims at incentivising a host of activities such as afforestation, water conservation and waste management by generating ‘green credits’

The Environment Ministry has issued a draft notification detailing a proposed ‘Green Credit Scheme’ that will incentivise a host of activities including afforestation programmes, water conservation, waste management and remedying air pollution by allowing individuals and organisations to generate ‘green credits”. These credits, through a yet-to-be-specified mechanism, can also be traded for money.

“A Green Credit Programme is proposed to be launched at national level to leverage a competitive market-based approach for Green Credits thereby incentivising voluntary environmental actions of various stakeholders. Apart from incentivising individual/community behaviour, the Green Credit Programme will encourage private sector industries and companies as well as other entities to meet their existing obligations, stemming from other legal frameworks, by taking actions which are able to converge with activities relevant for generating or buying Green Credits,” says the notification that is open to public comment for 60 days.

A senior official in the Ministry, told The Hindu that the government’s immediate priority was to “create supply (of green credits)” via voluntary actions and then “create demand by bringing in laws or rules that will incentivise companies and organisations to buy credits that can then be traded.” The official said that unlike carbon markets, where only greenhouse gas emissions were traded, the Green Credit Scheme was “trickier” as it involved accounting for a wide range of actions.

The notification for instance lists out eight sectors, or activities, that can qualify for generating credits. They include tree plantation-based green credit to promote activities for increasing green cover through tree plantation and related activities; water-based green credit to promote water conservation, water harvesting and water use efficiency/savings, including treatment and reuse of wastewater; sustainable agriculture-based green credit to promote natural and regenerative agricultural practices and land restoration to improve productivity, soil health and nutritional value of food produced; and waste management-based green credit to promote sustainable and improved practices.

2. ‘India, U.S. can join hands to boost security, stability’

India and the United States are willing to “deploy” ships in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, U.S. Ambassador Eric Garcetti said here on Wednesday.

Speaking at the Indian Institute of Technology, Mr. Garcetti said that in the interests of safeguarding peace, prosperity and sovereign borders, India and the U.S. could join hands to resist the “might makes right mentality” in international affairs.

“I hope soon we’ll see the United States and India working together across the Pacific and into the Atlantic, from Central Asia to Southern Africa. We can stand together against those who would upend the common good for their own benefit. We can deploy our ships together in the Pacific and Indian oceans, and even beyond, to ensure maritime security,” Mr. Garcetti said.

He was delivering a speech titled “Peace, prosperity, planet, people: a new chapter in U.S.-India relations”. Mr. Garcetti said that the U.S. is poised to be the suitable partner for India as both sides are tied by bonds of common values, science and technology and people-to-people contact. In 2022, Mr. Garcetti said one out of every five U.S. student visas issued across the world was received by an Indian student. With $191 billion dollars in bilateral trade, the U.S. is India’s largest trading partner.

“Our connection is very personal, based on affinity and friendship. We’re linked by a diaspora community more than four-million strong.”

The U.S. Ambassador avoided naming any country but said that there are states who believe in advancing their interest through aggressive means.

“Working together, the world’s two largest democracies can bolster the security, stability, and prosperity of the entire world,” said Mr. Garcetti.

3. Indian economy resilient despite global risks: RBI

India’s financial system has been stable and resilient despite significant strains in the West, RBI’s Governor said; non-performing assets of Indian banks fell to a 10-year low of 3.9% in March 2023

Despite the global economy facing heightened uncertainty, the Indian economy and the domestic financial system remain resilient supported by strong macroeconomic fundamentals, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) said in its biannual Financial Stability Report (FSR) on Wednesday.

Scheduled Commercial Banks’ gross non-performing assets ratio continued its downtrend and fell to a 10-year low of 3.9% in March 2023 and the net non-performing assets ratio declined to 1%, it said.

“Macro stress tests for credit risk reveal that SCBs would be able to comply with the minimum capital requirements even under severe stress scenarios,” the RBI said.

“The global financial system has been impacted by significant strains since early March from the banking turmoil in the U.S. and Europe,” Governor Shaktikanta Das wrote. “In contrast, the financial sector in India has been stable and resilient,” he added.

Mr. Das said both banking and corporate sector balance sheets had been strengthened, engendering a ‘twin balance sheet advantage’ for growth.

4. How much employment-generation does the economy need?

If policymakers talk of creating work for 5 million-8 million young in India, that will barely scratch India’s unemployment problem

Economists associated with the government have been arguing that there is not much unemployment since enough employment is being generated. Further, they argue that the employment required to be generated annually is not too much. Bibek Debroy, Chairperson of the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council, wrote in an article in The Indian Express that analysts are ignoring the drop in the population growth rate from 1.5% earlier to (possibly) 0.8% now. He asks “…how many jobs India needs to create every year.” He says, “When one encounters figures like 10 million or 12 million, one often doesn’t realise these are dated figures…circa 2003-04”. He suggests, “A rough range might be 5 [million]-8 million.”

Labour force

His statements reflect thinking in the government and need to be analysed. First, how is the current population growth rate relevant to the present increase in the labour force? The labour force comprises those in the age group of 15-64 (International Labout Organization definition) who are looking for work. The current population increase will impact the labour force 15 years later when those born this year will potentially join the labour force. So, even though Mr. Debroy discounts circa 2003-04, children born then are precisely the ones who have been entering the labour force since 2018-19 after obtaining a high school degree. In 2020-21, those obtaining an intermediate degree could have joined. And so on.

Further, even after obtaining a degree, people may not join the labour force as they may prepare for various exams. But eventually all of them will. The children of the lower income class can’t afford to remain unemployed for long. Middle-class children also have to start working as they face increasing social pressures. Very few of the young become entrepreneurs. This is because few possess the capital and skills required for this.

Second, it is the birth rate and not the rate of population increase that is relevant. Population increase equals births minus deaths. Life expectancy in India is above 70 years. Children also have higher mortality. So, we can subtract from the number of births in a given year the deaths among the under-five years. Assume a negligible number will die at ages 5-50. So, for the number of people entering the labour force, the death rate is not really crucial.

Applying the birth rate for a given year to the population gives the number of births in that year. Subtract from that the deaths among children below five years of age. That gives the increase in the potential number of young who can join the labour force 15 years later (at age 15). So, in 2000, the increase comes to 28,061,890, in 2002 the figure was 27,990,015, in 2005 it was 27,783,231, in 2007 it was 27,456,018, and in 2022 the increase was 24,167,206 (Table 1).

Why are these years selectively picked? They indicate that the potential young are increasing at the rate between 24 million to 28 million in the period 2000 to 2022. Further, these years are relevant because it is in those years that children in 2022 would have obtained high school, intermediate, under-graduate and graduate degrees and possibly looked for work. They potentially enter the labour force. Education data tells us what per cent of the relevant age group enrols for each of these degrees. So, those not enrolling would potentially join the labour force. Calculated this way (Table 2), the numbers potentially joining the labour force in 2022 would be 17,928,780 from those born in 2007; 2,583,841 from 2005; 5,598,003 from 2002; and 1,403,095 from 2000. The total is 27,513,718.

Fewer women are likely to join the labour force for social reasons, so the above numbers have to be segregated between women and men. In 2022, there were 1,068 men for every 1,000 women. This means that 48.35% of the total number would be women (13,304,506). Assume 25% of them will not be able to work for social reasons. This yields 24,187,591 potential young people who could enter the labour force in 2022. Some of them would prepare for exams. But those from earlier years who have already spent years preparing for exams would join the labour force. Actually, if enough work was available, most of them would not appear repeatedly for many of these exams. Some of the young will go abroad for work and/or studies but their number is small compared to the total. Many of them may also not go abroad if work was available.

Unorganised sector

The organised sector is mechanised and automated and generates few jobs. That is why 94% of the labour force is in the unorganised sector, largely working at low wages. On the e-Shram portal, 28 crore were registered in November 2022 and 94% reported earning less than ₹10,000 per month. The growth of the organised sector at the expense of the unorganised sector results in rising unemployment. Unemployment has been characterised as unemployment; under-employment; disguised unemployment; and those who have stopped looking for work. Simplified assumptions give the figure of those needing proper work at 286 million — all of them from the unorganised sector. Only 332 million have proper work and most of them also work in the unorganised sector. This data makes it clear that if policymakers talk of creating work for 5 million-8 million young, that will barely scratch India’s unemployment problem.

5. Changing economy of rural West Bengal

The decrease of employment in agricultural and manufacturing sectors and a subsequent increase in construction and services sectors, along with the inclusion of the nouveau-rich class in electoral politics, are bound to affect the upcoming panchayat elections in the State

As panchayat elections are nearing in West Bengal — voting is on July 8 — three streams of political discourse are becoming more and more apparent across different platforms. The first stream often reiterates the inevitability of the Trinamool Congress retaining its majority despite several corruption and criminal charges against members of the leadership in recent times. This line of discourse primarily banks on the large-scale cash-transfer schemes and the ‘incorruptible’ public image of the Chief Minister.

The second discourse acknowledges the recent win recorded by the Left-Congress alliance in the recent by-election (it is another matter that the candidate has since joined Trinamool) and other local body elections while dismissing their chance at becoming a harbinger of change at the larger electoral level. This is partly due to the previous Assembly Election performances and more importantly a critique of the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPIM) led Left Front being a party of ‘old-veterans’.

The third stream that is doing the rounds still hopes that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) could be a game-changer and could stand up to the alleged violence and cut-money culture that Trinamool is often associated with. However, this stream of discourse is getting quieter because of the regular in-and-out migration of political leaders between the Trinamool and the BJP. Therefore, at this juncture, the BJP might be considered to be in an incapacitated condition within the political arena of West Bengal. In this article, we will focus on the changes that have occurred in the rural economy of West Bengal during the last decade, and how those changes have shaped the political formations for both the Trinamool and the Left. This might provide a deeper understanding of the first and second discourses that we have mentioned above, and take the discussion beyond the tiring binary rhetoric of ‘Trinamool’s cash transfer worked’ and ‘CPI(M) is old’.

The crisis of income in agriculture

For an analysis of change in class structures, the first characteristic of rural West Bengal that stands out is a gradual, secular process of households losing land — of de-peasantisation and subsequent proletarianisation. And as per succeeding reports of the National Family Health Survey, this proportion has steadily decreased. According to the NFHS-5, 2019–21, over 65.2% of all rural families in West Bengal do not own any agricultural land. The most recent Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS, 2020) before COVID classifies less than a quarter (24.1%) of all rural households as self-employed in agriculture (that is, whose primary source of income was self-employment in agriculture) — a broad requirement for being classified as a peasant household. This is a minor increase over the 19% estimate provided by the most recent NSSO Employment Unemployment Survey (EUS 2011–12). Furthermore, 95% of the operational holdings in the State have fallen below one hectare. This means the subsequent fragmentation of land parcels have made the average size of operational holdings 0.35 hectares in 2018-19. This is quite low compared with the all-India average. With the rising cost of cultivation (partly attributed to irrigation costs) and the lack of price realisation, the average income from crop and livestock cultivation has become minuscule when seen in terms of its share in total household income in the villages. In the recent round of the Situation Assessment Survey (2018-19), it was seen that, in nominal terms, a typical agricultural household in West Bengal earns ₹1,547 from crop income per month which is 22% of the total household income. The all-India average for the same would be ₹3,798. The sheer crisis of income does indicate that there must lie a possibility of Left-led peasant movements. While there are a few pockets where one witnesses such protests, a consolidation is not observed. This is perhaps because of two reasons. First, more than half of the class base of the peasant organisation, which are the self-employed persons in agriculture, are now above 45 years of age. Second, perhaps more importantly, crop income is only one of multiple sources of household income. The most important source of income for this semi-proletariat section in the State has become wage income. Of the total household income, 55% is now accrued from wages.

Only a consolidation of the proletarianised small peasants and landless manual workers into a rural-worker movement could revive the traditional class politics that the Left, and more importantly the CPI(M), in the State have been associated with. Without such a consolidation, a shrinking and aged peasantry won’t be able to turn the electoral site in favour of the larger call for reviving a leftist spirit of politics.

Employment sources in rural Bengal

While unemployment did rise in West Bengal between 2011 and 2020, it was a common phenomenon across India. What remains of importance in the case of West Bengal is the structurally changing work-site for the workforce. A decline in manufacturing workforce certainly creates challenges for organisations such as the Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU) to bring class questions to the forefront. Additionally, since 68% of rural working women are still engaged in activities such as household care and reproductive labour in the State, Trinamool could generate some amount of electoral clientele within the female voters through cash transfer schemes etc. (Table 1)

With a decline in the scale of employment in both agriculture and manufacturing, the sectors that have generated employment are the construction and services sectors. However, the nature of employment is entirely different in both these sectors, and are related to the economic outlook of the policies undertaken by Trinamool. More than 90% of the construction workers in the State are casual wage workers. In 2019-20, 61% of service sector workers were self-employed, which in simple terms mean they are petty service providers fending for themselves due to distress in general. The rest of the 34% salaried service employees, who were earlier largely associated in the political discourse with the so-called ‘Left party society,’ have been carefully sidelined from rural political discourse. This ‘Left-party society’ was often identified with the educated middle class who managed party tasks while being engaged in government services such as school teaching, public sector employment etc.

The neo-rich business class

The Trinamool has also created a ‘nexus of corruption-syndicate-crime’ which has now been highlighted in every platform including the judiciary. This process gathered momentum in their second term (2016), where a nouveau-rich class, particularly engaged in real estate and several other local businesses, was promoted to the role of high-profile party organisers and became the core managerial elements in the Trinamool party. The recent corruption charges against certain Trinamool leaders such as Anubrata Mondal and alike would be exemplar of this class who are engaged in the ‘extraction of public resources’ by scam and corruption. This section plays a crucial managerial role in the electoral and day-to-day activities of the Trinamool party. If we take the election affidavits of the Association for Democratic Reforms for the last two Assembly Elections in the State, we observe a little more than a 40% rise (from 67 candidates to 95 candidates) in Trinamool candidates with ‘business’ as their primary occupation; and a decline of roughly 45% (from 119 to 85) in candidates under the professional/ service category (See Table 2).

The inclusion of the neo-rich business class becomes obvious, when one looks into the asset declaration data of Trinamool candidates (See Table 3). The average asset ownership of the Trinamool candidates was almost 33 times more than the average asset ownership of rural households in the last elections. This is the effect of the inclusion of the rural nouveau-rich, which is different in character than the earlier ‘left-party society’. It also reflects that their political managerial character is largely extractive in nature and has created a havoc of corruptive practices within the State.

In conclusion

What seems to be of importance in rural West Bengal is the changing political formation emanating from the economic shifts in the State. A shrinking peasantry along with a huge pool of casual wage workers co-exist. These sections might in principle be the political allies of the Left. The recent protests by student-youth organisations along with the CPIM-cadreship in the State foreground the questions of unemployment and corruption, which are tied to the current ruling party. There is, however, a larger class question that lurks in the background — the rising importance of the ‘neo-rural rich’ that provides managerial inputs to Trinamool. This class is backed and brought inside democratic institutions by Trinamool. To what extent the current student-youth resistance is able to challenge the managerial and political efficacy of this class remains to be seen in the upcoming panchayat elections.

Soham Bhattacharya is Assistant Professor at B. R. Ambedkar School of Economics University, Bengaluru. Debodeep Banerjee is a doctoral scholar in AI at the University of Pisa, Italy, and the University of Trento, Italy.